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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

MAKING A BAD CHECK GOODPREFERENCE RISKS CAUSED BY
BOUNCED CHECK

Every lender has experienced the
disappointment and anxiety that results when a check received as a
payment in the ordinary course of
business is returned by a debtor's
bank because of insufficient funds.
The concern may be aggravated to
a feeling of alarm if, when the check
was received, the lender had released a security interest in the debtor's goods. Of course, whether or
not the lender has a security interest
in the debtor's assets, a lender holding a bounced check often is relieved when the debtor either replaces the bad check with one that
is honored by the bank or effectuates
payment by cash or wire transfer.
However, as illustrated by the
recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in In re
Barefoot, 1 a lender who is unsecured, or who had released its secu-
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952 F.2d 795 (4th Cir. 1991).

rity interest upon receiving the debtor's original check, may not take
too much comfort in the fact that
payment is effectuated subsequent
to a check being dishonored. Such
payment may be recoverable as a
voidable preference under Section
547 of the Bankruptcy Code2 if the
debtor becomes the subject of a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy
petition within the next ninety days.
In fact, the dishonoring of the check
may itself expose the subsequent
payment to attack as a preference
despite the fact that, if the check had
been paid when first presented, such
payment would not have been a
voidable preference.
In Barefoot, the debtor, doing
business as D&M Mobile Home
(D&M), entered into a floor plan
financing agreement with Chani.pion Credit Corporation (Champion)
pursuant to which Champion loaned
money to D&M to enable it to purchase mobile homes from Champion Home Builders to be resold to
consumers. Champion took a purchase money security interest in a
portion of D&M's inventory that
it had financed, as well as in the
proceeds of that inventory. Although Champion had reserved the
right to demand payment at an earli2
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er time, D&M agreed to pay off the
loans as it sold each unit. Champion
also held the certificate of origin for
each mobile home as the means of
perfecting its security interest, and
it did not release any certificate until
D&M repaid the outstanding indebtedness for the relevant mobile
home.
On April 20, 1987, Champion
received a check from D&M for the
sum of $133,538 in payment of the
amounts owed in connection with
five mobile homes that D&M had
sold to customers. Champion released the five certificates of origin
for the mobil homes, thereby releasing the security interests in those
homes, before learning on April30
that D&M's check had bounced.
This was the first time that a check
drawn by D&M to Champion had
been dishonored. Tp make up for
the bounced check, D&M sent
Champion's parent company, Chrysler First Commercial Corporation (Chrysler First), three wire
transfers totaling the sum of
$109,664.07. The wire transfers
were sent on May 13, May 29, and
June 3, 1987.
On August 5, 1987, an involuntary chapter 7 petition was filed
against D&M, and the trustee commenced an adversary proceeding
against both Champion and Chrysler First seeking to set aside the
three wire transfers as preferences
occurring within ninety days of the
filing of the bankruptcy petition.
After conducting an evidentiary
hearing, the bankruptcy court ruled
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in favor of the trustee and ordered
the return of the $109,664.07 plus
interest. On appeal, the district
court affirmed the bankruptcy
court's decision.
The issue before the court of appeals was whether pay·ment by a
debtor to an unsecured creditor,. or
to a secured creditor who had released its security interest prior to
such payment, made within ninety
days of bankruptcy, constitutes a
voidable preference under Section
547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
where the purpose of the payment
was to "cure" a dishonored check
of the debtor that, if honored when
originally presented, would not
have been a voidable preference.
The bankruptcy court, district
court, and court of appeals all ruled
that the payments were recoverable
as voidable preferences.
The court of appeals began by
citing Section 547(b) as the source
of the bankruptcy court's power to
avoid preferential transfers to creditors:
Two purposes animate this statutory
avoidance power. First, the avoidance power promotes the ''prime
bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors'' by ensuring that all creditors of the same class
will receive the same pro rata share
of the debtor's estate .. : . Second,
the avoidance power discourages
creditors from attempting to outmaneuver each other in an effort to carve
up a financially unstable debtor and
offers a concurrent opportunity for
the debtor to work out its financial
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difficulties in an atmosphere conducive to cooperation. 3

Elements of a Preference
The court then listed the six elements that must be present for a
transfer to be avoided under Section
547(b):
The transfer must have been (1) of
an interest of the debtor in property;
(2) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(3) for or on account of an antecedent
debt owed by the debtor before the
transfer was made; (4) made while
the debtor was insolvent; (5) made
on or within ninety days of the filing
of the bankruptcy petition; and (6) it
must enable the creditor to receive a
greater percentage of its claim than it
would under the normal distributive
provisions in a liquidation c.ase under
the Bankruptcy Code. 4

Champion took the position that
several of the elements of a preference have not been proven. First, it
argued that the date of the delivery
of the check should be considered
the date of the transfer and, therefore, the transfer in this case took
place prior to the ninety-day preference period. Champion cited anumber of decisions of the Fourth Circuit for the proposition that the date
of delivery of the check operated to

fix the time of transfer. 5 "Champion, however, overlooks the critical
fact that in each of those cases, the
check at issue had been honored
when presented for payment. When
a check bounces, the date of delivery of the dishonored check no longer determines the time of transfer
for the purpose of§ 547(b). " 6 The
court reasons that the rationale for
the "date of delivery" rule, which
has been adopted in several jurisdictions including the Fourth Circuit
and which has been rejected in others, is that in the commercial world,
payment by check is often viewed as
the end of a commercial transaction.
"The delivery of a bounced check,
however, can in no way be deemed
the end of a commercial transaction.
Indeed, the transfers in this case
which ended the transaction were
the wire transfers which clearly took
place within the ninety-day preference period.' ' 7
Referring to Champion's position, that the date of delivery of the
dishonored check determines the
5 Champion cited In re Virginia lnformationSys. Corp., 932 F.2d338, 341-342 (4th
Cir. 1991) (involving date of transfer under
§ 547(b)); Quinn Wholesale Inc. v. Northen, 873 F.2d 77, 78 (4th Cir. 1989) (involving avoidance powers of trustee for postpetition transfers under 11 U.S.C.
§ 549(a)(l)); In re Continental Commodities
Inc., 821 F.2d 527, 530 (4th Cir. 1989)
(involving former forty-five-day limit for
§ 547(c)(2) ordinary-course-of-business exception to preference avoidance).
6 952 F.2d at 798. The court of appeals
cited In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d
631, 634 (lOth Cir. 1986); In re Global lnt'l
Airways Corp., 80 Bankr. 990, 995 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1987).
7
952 F .2d at 798.

3 952 F.2d at 797-798, quoting from
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
177-178 (1978).
4
952 F.2d at 798. The court did not
mention the fact that the preference period
is extended to one year prior to bankruptcy
if the creditor is an insider. See 11 U.S. C.
§ 547(b)(4).
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time of transfer, the court observed
that such interpretation would have
the anomalous effect of giving operative legal significance to dishonored checks, and would also undermine both policies underlying
Section 547(b):

sponded by noting that "the argument was not raised at the trial level,
has no relevant legal authority in
support of it, and overlooks the fact
that this is nothing more than a traditional debtor-creditor relationship
in which the indicia of a trust are
not present.' ' 9
The court similarly dismissed the
argument that the payment was not
on account of an antecedent debt
because the debt is not incurred until
it becomes due and payable. That
is, as long as the debt is paid when
due, it is not a preference. The court
noted that a debt is incurred when
the debtor first becomes legally obligated to pay. Here, D&M became
obligated to pay as soon as it received an advance for the purchase
of a mobile home, not later when
the home is sold and repayment is
to be made.
The court also addressed Champion's position that the final element
of a preference under Section
547(b)(5)-that the creditor receive
more as a result of the transfer than
it would have received if the transfer
had not been made and had the debtor flied a chapter 7 petition-was
not present. It is clear that a properly
perfected and fully secured creditor
that receives payment shortly before
bankruptcy is not receiving a preference because it would have received
full payment in chapter 7 in any
event. There is also no dispute that
if Champion is considered an unsecured creditor at the time of the
payment, the wire transfers enabled

First, favoritism of certain creditors
with payments making good bad
checks deals .a serious blow to the
fundamental bankruptcy policy of
equality of distribution among members of the same class .... Second,
creditors may possess greater incentives to forsake cooperative arrangements involving financially troubled
debtors if the delivery date of dishonored checks is to become the operative one under bankruptcy preference
law. With the insufficiency of funds
in a debtor's account less of an immediate constraint, creditors may be
tempted to demand payment from a
debtor on the edge of bankruptcy
rather than negotiate a work-out plan
on the grounds that even a bad check
might later be ·made good without
risking avoidance of the payment as
a preference. 8

Several other arguments were
presented by Champion in support
of its position that the elements of a
preference·were not established, but
they were quickly dismissed by the
court with little discussion. Champion argued that the wire transfers
were not transfers of the debtor's
property because they were proceeds from the sale of the mobile
homes held in trust for Champion
by D&M. However, the court re8
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952F.2dat798-799.
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it to receive more than it would have
in a chapter 7 case due to
the debtor's insolvency. J'he court
concluded that Champion was not a
secur¢. creditor at the time of the
payments in question because it had
released its security interest in, the
mobile homes prior to the date of
the wire transfers.
Once the eJements of a preference
~re
established under~ Section
547(b), the creditor may assert any
of the defenses set forth in Section
547(c). Champion raised two exceptions to preferences as defenses,
but both were rejected by the court
of appeals.

payments that were made were the
wire transfers that took place within
the ninety-day preference period.
These payments within the preference period were not contemporaneous with the release of the certificates of origin that occurred before
the preference period. "Indeed, to
relate the wire transfers back to the
time of the certificates' release in
order to make the exchange contemporaneous is to accord the very operative legal significance to the bad
check we have rejected in the preceding section.'' 11
More important, the court wrote
that "when a bounced cl,leck is given
by the debtor in exchange for new
value provided by a cre~itor, any
subsequent payment to make good
the bad check is not a contemporaneous exchange for new
value.'' 12 The contemporaneousexchange exception does not ordinarily apply to credit transactions,
but it is intended to protect contemporaneous ex~~anges in which a
check is used for payment as a cash
equivalent:

receive~

The Contemporaneous Exchange
for New Value Exceptio!!
Champion argued that, even if all
the element~ of a preference had
been proven, the wire transfers
were a contemporaneous exchange
for new value given to the debtor
which is protected from avoidance
pursuant to Section 547(c)(1). 10 It
reasoned that the release of the security interest in the five mobile homes
in exchange for D&M's bad check
constituted a contemporaneous exchange for new value. However,
the court concluded that the only

Unlike the case of an honored check
or a cash payment where there is only
one exchange between the debtor and
creditor, the case of a dishonored
check involves multiple exchanges
and thuS" assumes the character of a
credit transaction: tp.e debtor gives
the bad check, which in this context

10
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(l). Section
547(a)(2) ~rovides that "new value" means
money ~r money's worth in goods, services, or new credit, or release by a
-transferee of property previously transferred to such transferee in a transaction
that is neither void nor voidable by the
debtor or the trustee under any applicable
law, including proceeds of such property, but does not include an obligation
substituted for an existing obligation.

952 F.2d 800.
952 F.2d at 800. The court cited In re
Standard Food Servs, Inc., 723 F.2d 820,
821 (lith Cir. 1984) (cashier's check making good a bounced check held not a contemporaneous exchange for new value).
II

12

87

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LAW JOURNAL

is the functional equivalent of a
promissory note, followed by one or
more payments to make good the
check. The dishonor of a check,
therefore, defeats the actual achievementofacontemporaneousexchange
for new value, and we conclude that
any payments to make good a
bounced check cannot qualify as
transfers to which the contemporaneous exchange exception applies. 13

be viewed as the ordinary course
of business. Citing the legislative
history of the Code, the court noted
that the purpose of the ordinary
course of business exception is to
leave normal business relations undisturbed when there is no unusual
action taken by either the debtor or
the creditor. Again emphasizing its
concern that bounced checks should
not be encouraged, the court of appeals wrote:

Bouncing a Check Not in Ordinary
Course of Business
Champion also argued that the
ordinary course of business exception set forth in Section 547(c)(2)
protects the wire transfers from
avoidance by the trustee. 14 For this
exception to apply, the creditor
must prove, among other things,
that the transfer was made in the
ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee. Champion attempted to
persuade the court that it was the
ordinary course of business for it to
release the relevant certificates of
origin upon receipt of D&M's
checks and that the court should not
distinguish between the receipt of
good checks and the receipt of bad
checks for this purpose. It also argued that the wire transfers merely
represented a delayed honoring of
the check and that, therefore, the
wire transfers should not be the focus ·of the ordinary course inquiry.
The court rejected the position
that a bounced check and subsequent payments to make it good may
13
14
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Quite apart from the fact that the
bankruptcy court found that' 'the dishonoring of the check was a deviation
from the ordinary course of business
between the parties" and that the
subsequent wire ,transfers represented an uncustomary medium of payment, to allow parties to benefit from
writing ·or receiving bad checks
would almost certainly result in a
greater number of such checks being
passed. One can hardly imagine anything that would be more disruptive
of ''normal financial relations'' between troubled debtors and their
creditors than affording dishonored
checks the imprimatur of law. 15

In a concurring opinion, Judge
Widener went even further than the
majority opinion in that he would
not base affirmance on the conclusion that the bankruptcy court was
not clearly erroneous in its factual
fmding that the conduct of the parties was not the ordinary course
of business in this case. Widener,
suggesting adoption of a per se rule,
voted to affirm because Congress
did not intend that making a bad

952 F.2d at 800.
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2).

"952 F.2d at 801.
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make the transfer and the transferee
was presumably willing to accept it. 18

check good shoplc;J. be protected by
the ordinary course of business exception under Section 547(c)(2), regardless of whether it has occurred
in the past. ''To rely on the factual
determination of the coijrts below
in the circumstances present here
may suggest that if the parties had
gone through like factual situations
on previous occasions in making
bad checks good, a fmding of ordinary course of business or financial
affairs might have been sustained. I
do not think that is the case. " 16

The court also commented that
the adoption of Champion's position
regarding the equities of the situation would require a court to make
judgments on factual issues, including the (1) creditor's knowledge of
the debtor's financial troubles; (2)
reasonableness of the belief that the
check was good; (3) intent of the
parties in making the bad check
good; and (4) reasonableness of the
time of payment after the check
bounced. The court noted that this
approach would result in much litigation and that ''it runs directly
counter to the intent of the drafters
of the preference provisions to eliminate these litigious inquiries in favor of a clear application of objective criteria. " 19
The court also rejected the contention that Champion was powerless to prevent the loss of its security
interest. Champion voluntarily released the certificates of origin before waiting to see if the check had
cleared. As the bankruptcy court
stated,

Equities Do Not Favor Creditor
Champion's final argument was
that the equities of the situation demanded that it be allowed to retain
the payments made by wire transfer.
Champion had no way of knowing
that D&M was in financial trouble,
and claimed that it was powerless to
protect itself from the actions of
D&M that resulted in the release of
the security interest. Also, Champion emphasized that the wire transfers were intended only to replace
the bounced check. ''Thus Champion believes that treating it as an
unsecured creditor would be a triumph of form over substance which
would defeat the parties' intent. " 17
The court was not persuaded.

''Champion . . is a sophisticated
commercial lender which certainly
understands the consequences of releasing collateral in reliance upon
payment by check.'' In this case,
Champion took a legal risk by releasing its security interest before being
assured of payment, and regrettably

While we agree that Champion's position is unfortunate, we believe it is
mandated under law. The avoidance
of every preference will to some extent defeat the intent of the parties
because the transferor was willing to
16

17

18

952 F.2d at 802.
952 F.2d at 801.

19
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it must now accept the legal
quences. 20

'conse~
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because the creditor was fully secured at the time the check was
delivered, the original delivery of
Conclusion
the check was in the ordinary course
of
business, the check was delivered
The court's decision in Barefoot
before
the preference period, or the
contains no surprises. The court,
transaction
would have been a conmade it clear that a creditor who
temporaneous
exchange for new
receives a check that bounces, but
value-may
not
protect the subseis subsequently made good by actual
quent
payment
from
the reach of the
payment, may run the risk that the
trustee
if
the
elements
of Section
payment may be recoverable as a
547(b)
are
present.
preference if the debtor files a bankFinally, the court did not hesitate
ruptcy p~tition within ninety days
to warn secured creditors: "[T]he
after the payment. The fact that
rule will serve notice to secured
there would have been no prefercreditors to retain their security inence exposure had the check been terests until payment is aspaid when originally presented- sured .... " 21
20

21

952 F.2d at 802.
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